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Abstract—The stated aim of the EU Single Electricity Market
(ESEM) is to link together EU electricity markets and get a
unique electricity price across the EU. This target will be met by
promoting efficient trading between price zones. Jointly with the
ESEM, the EU has set separate ambitious targets for greenhouse
gas emissions and renewable energy use: for emissions reduction
these are stated as 20% lower than 1990 levels by 2020, rising
to 40% lower by 2030 and 85% lower by 2050 that will directly
and indirectly promote the investment in renewables. By 2030,
massive changes in EU electricity markets will take place. High
investments in renewables associated with the necessity of efficient
trades may result in network congestion, which rises the costs of
the EU electricity system. In this work we use a PLEXOS model
to verify the level of network congestion in 2030 and assuming
interconnection according to the 10 year network development
plan (TYNDP). We determine where further investment in
interconnection can contribute to decreasing system costs at the
EU level. The choice of the optimal investment is endogenised in
the model. First we verify how the wholesale electricity prices
change in EU countries. Second we check how profits are affected
by the new investments. Finally we perform a welfare analysis
including the emission savings achieved with the new investments
in transmission networks. Our results indicate that individual
interconnection upgrades reduce total system costs and therefore
increase net welfare at the EU level. In addition, a shift from
producer surplus to consumer surplus can be observed as a result
of a higher level of interconnection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the European Single Electricity Market
(ESEM) has been a stated aim of the European Union (EU) in
order to promote efficient trading of electricity.1 The ambitious
targets set by the European Commission on emission reduction
for the electricity sector (and some large industry installations)
through the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Direc-
tive 2003/87/EC and for increased deployment of renewables
in Directive 2009/28 will drive large increases in renewable
electricity generation to 2030 and beyond. ESEM will play
a crucial role in accommodating renewable generation by
promoting interconnection between countries. This paper will
analyse how the 10 year network development plan (TYNDP)
made by ENTSO-E may be extended in order to minimise
the ESEM costs in 2030. The differences between centralised
1See Directive 2009/72 on common rules for the internal market and
Regulation (EC) 713/2009, which established the Agency for Cooper-
ation of Energy Regulators. On the transition from regional to sin-
gle market see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2010
gas electricity markets.pdf.
and decentralised investment choices were already examined
by [1], [2] and [3]. [4] analyse the impact of storage vs.
interconnection investment on renewable curtailment by means
of a linear optimisation model. However, there are no studies
so far providing in-depth insight into the economic implica-
tions of lumpy interconnection invesments beyond the TYNDP
for producers and consumers in the ESEM. This paper will
endogenise the investment choices in interconnection between
EU countries in order to understand how European welfare will
change when projects that minimise the total system costs are
undertaken. Moreover, we will investigate how the intercon-
nection lines will affect individual EU countries. The paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the methodology.
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 summarises the results
and the final Section concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY
The software used to model the electricity market is the
PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model which is a modelling tool
used for electricity and gas market modelling and planning.2
The model optimises thermal and renewable generation and
pumped storage subject to operational and technical con-
straints at hourly resolution. The objective function is to
minimise total costs over the years across the full system.
This includes operational costs, consisting of fuel costs and
carbon costs; start-up costs consisting of a fuel offtake at
start-up of a unit and a fixed unit start-up cost (see [5]).
The resulting market price is defined as the marginal price at
market schedule level and does not include any extra revenues
from potential balancing, reserve or capacity markets or costs
such as grid infrastructure cost, capital costs or taxes. These
additional revenues or costs are not considered in our study.
In our simulations a perfect market is assumed across the EU
(i.e. no market power or bidding behaviour and power plants
bid their short run marginal cost). A power plant portfolio
is constructed for each Member State from the year 2013 to
the year 2030. In all, approximately 2,220 individual thermal
power plants are included in the model. Power plant capacities,
efficiencies and fuel types are based on outputs from the
PRIMES model for the EU countries. Interconnection between
Member States is modelled as net transfer capacities and no
2The software is available here: http://energyexemplar.com/.
interregional transmission is considered. Our analysis is made
in three stages. First, we define the ”Baseline” scenario, in
which the line expansions defined by TYNDP are assumed
to be effective in the system; we then assess whether there
are congested lines in the system. We include in our model
only the projects evaluated to be probable in the TYNDP.
This choice gives us more accuracy in determining our re-
sults.3 Second, we include some possible expansion candidates
(defined in the ”Line expansions” scenario) of the congested
lines into our model. The modelling horizon is 17 years, from
2013 to 2030. For each year, the algorithm endogenously
evaluates whether the planned investment in transmission lines
will reduce the total costs, and if the benefits associated to this
investment will overcome the annual costs associated to the
investment project.4 Third, we determine the impact of the new
transmission lines on system prices, the generator’s profits and
the overall welfare. In order to quantify the costs associated
with the interconnection we take into account that the EU
supports several forms of financial help [6]. The involvement
of financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank
and the ad-hoc financed programmes proposed by the EU
Commission make the funding of new transmission lines par-
tially public. In particular the projects marked as of ”common
interest” are evaluated not only important for the EU security
of supply, but also economically feasible, and then will be
co-financed by the EU institutions [7]. In our scenario we
assume that the interest rate of the line expansions will be 4%
for a payback period of 60 years. Once the long-term schedule
identifies the expansion candidates that are optimal and thus
reduce total system costs relative to the ”Baseline” scenario,
we include these new lines into the system and run the model
for 2030 in hourly resolution. As a robustness check we also
run a scenario in which we assume that the projects will be
mainly funded by private investors, with an interest rate of 6%
and a payback period of 30 years. The optimisation tolerance
used in the simulation is 0.1%.
III. HYPOTHESES
The data used in this model has been described in [8]. Here
we summarise the most significant hypotheses and explain the
assumptions made on the transmission lines in detail.
A. Fuel prices and demand
The assumed fuel prices are consistent with the PRIMES
scenarios. Gas price is assumed to be 65 e/boe, oil 93 e/boe
and coal 24 e/boe, all in 2010 prices. We also consider a
carbon price (ETS) of 40e/tonne. It should be noted that these
assumptions are rather high and will drive all our results. The
PRIMES Reference scenario results detail overall electrical
3The report is available here: https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/
ten-year-network-development-plan/tyndp-2014/Pages/default.aspx. The de-
scription of the difference between the lines included in our model and the
TYNDP is available from the authors upon request.
4Theoretically, cost minimisation will lead to competitive prices, which
maximise consumer’s surplus and will induce firms to behave competitively.
We then consider total cost minimisation as the criterion to establish the
optimality of the investment projects.
demand at an annual level only. The power system model
constructed is at an hourly resolution, thus required an hourly
electrical demand profile. This was done through attaining
historic demand profiles from ENTSO-E for each Member
State for the year 2012 and scaling them to 2030 overall
projected demand detailed in the PRIMES results. In the
Scenario examined, electricity demand rises by 12% between
2010 and 2030 on a EU level. Driving forces for this include
greater penetration of appliances following economic growth,
which mitigate the effects of eco-design standards on new
products, increasing use of heat pumps and electro-mobility.
For the purpose of this study, demand is assumed inelastic
with respect to price; as a result, the same demand profiles
are assumed in the scenario with new interconnection.
B. Interconnection
The transmission lines considered by our model include the
existing level of interconnection and the majority of projects
included in the TYNDP. Modelling results for the ”Baseline”
scenario show that several interconnection lines will be con-
gested by 2030 (see Figure 1). We rank the existing lines by
Fig. 1. Hours of congestion, all the lines
hours of congestion; we then identify as ”severely congested”
all the lines with more than 3000 hours of congestion per
year, which are at the right side of Figure 1. We identified as
”severely congested” the lines between Austria and Hungary,
UK and France, France and Italy, Bulgaria and Greece, Poland
and Slovakia, Norway and UK and Belgium and UK. For
those lines, we plan some line extensions, using the data in
the TYNDP on capacity and total costs. Some of the lines
identified as heavily congested do not have any expansions
planned in the TYNDP. As a result, we approximate the costs
of this line using information on the line distance and the
capacity required. In particular we use the data available for
other interconnection lines to estimate the possible cost for the
transmission lines between Poland and Slovakia and between
Austria and Hungary. We estimate a polynomial regression
between the costs included in the TYNDP and the relation
between distance covered and interconnector capacity. We
found an intercept equal to 41.03 and a coefficient of 0.0018.
We use these two parameters to estimate the costs associated
to the interconnectors for which no information were available.
TABLE I
LINE EXPANSIONS AND ASSOCIATED COSTS ( IN 2010 M e)
New
line ex-
pansion
(MW)
Capacity
already in
the model
(MW)
Min
eM
Max
eM
Mean
eM
FR-IT 1400 4000 1198 1415 1306
FR-UK 1000 2500 349 650 500
NO-UK 1400 1400 1586 1586
BE-UK 1000 1000 490 630 560
BG-GR 638 550 92 92
PL-SK 600 600 283 318 300
AT-HU 300 300 202 242 222
The expanded lines we considered in our model are shown by
Table I. In the first column of the Table, we considered the
installable new capacity in MW. We consider as expansion
candidates new transmission lines with the same technical
characteristics as the existing lines. In order to make the
model choose the optimal level of interconnection between
the congested lines, we offer 6 expansion candidates for each
transmission line. Column 3 and 4 report the minimum and the
maximum costs in 2010 prices, as assumed by the TYNDP.
We scale the cost of the planned expansions according to the
TYNDP when the size of the investment proposed to our
model was different from the one already included in the
TYNDP. Costs for the line expansions between Poland and
Slovakia and Austria and Hungary have been calculated as
explained below. The 4th column reports the average between
the maximum and the minimum,which we use as an input in
the model to make the model choose in which lines to invest.
Thus, we run the ”Line extensions” scenario, which includes
the investments in new transmission lines.
IV. RESULTS
Investment in additional new lines is undertaken only be-
tween Bulgaria and Greece. 5 In order to understand the impact
of the new transmission lines, we compare the ”Baseline” and
the ”Line extensions” scenarios, focusing on four different
aspects. First we investigate the impact of new lines on
the existing network. Second, we check how the prices and
the profits change in the interested regions and in Europe
after the investment is undertaken. Third, we focus on the
environmental impact of the new lines checking how emissions
and emission costs change in the two scenarios. Finally we
examine the welfare gains associated with the ”Line exten-
sions” model. All results are reported for the year 2030 in the
following.
A. Interconnection lines
In the ”Line extensions” scenario, ranking the network
lines by the hours congested give similar results as in the
”Baseline” scenario. Again the most congested interconnectors
are the transmission lines between Austria and Hungary (4870
5Also in the robustness check scenario with 6% of interest rate and 30
years investment horizon the results do not change
h) and between Poland and Slovakia (4670 h). Also, the
interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria (including the
upgrades) stays heavily congested, even though the number
of congested hours can be reduced to approx. 3700 per year
on average through the new interconnection lines. Finally, as
no line expansion was selected for France-UK, Belgium-UK
or Norway-UK, all these interconnectors stay congested for
more than 3000 hours per year. In addition, the new lines
built into the system bring some congestion in lines that were
not congested in the ”Baseline” scenario, as shown by Figure
2.
Fig. 2. Congested hours after the investment in new lines: baseline vs new
investment
B. Prices and profits
To better understand the effects of the new lines in the
EU system, we investigate how wholesale prices and the
generator’s profits change between the ”Baseline” and the
”Line extensions” scenarios. Only the prices related to the
wholesale market are considered in our analysis. Thus, in order
to analyse the consumer surplus and the producer profits we
make the assumption that the wholesale price partially reflects
both the retail and the balancing prices. This approximation
may lead to several biases that should be discussed. The profits
of thermal generators are potentially underestimated, because
we do not take the balancing market into account. With high
renewable penetration in the market, thermal generators are
frequently providing electricity on the balancing market, in
order to compensate the intermittency of the renewable plants.
At the same time, the benefits for the consumers are potentially
biased, because in our model we do not take into account the
forward market; retail prices will be higher than the wholesale
prices and this is amplified if retail markets are not competitive
and consumers do not switch their provider frequently [9],
[10].
1) Prices: The average European wholesale electricity
price goes from 88e/MWh in the ”Baseline” to approx.
87e/MWh in the ”Line extensions” scenario. Thus, the in-
vestment in new transmission lines is beneficial for European
consumers, as on average, the electricity price decreases by
1%. The effects of the new lines between Greece and Bulgaria
are positive for the consumers in both countries, as the prices
are lower than in the ”Baseline” scenario. The wholesale
electricity prices decrease in Bulgaria from 92 to 86 e/MWh.
Moreover, the price in Greece decreases by more than 5
e/MWh, going from 98 e/MWh to below 93 e/MWh. In
the other heavily congested areas, there is almost no effect on
the prices. In Belgium and UK the prices increase slightly; for
all the other countries interested in line congestion (Poland,
Slovakia, Austria and Hungary) the electricity price decreases.
This is an expected result: as more interconnection is built
between countries, more the prices will tend to converge to
the average EU price.
2) Generator’s profits: We calculate the generator’s profits
as follows:
pis,i,t =
∑
t
(ps ∗Generations,i,t − TCs,i,t) (1)
In which t is the hour, i the generator’s type (renewable or
thermal), s is the considered scenario. TC are the total costs of
the generator which include the start up, the emission and the
actual generation costs. At the European level, both thermal
and renewable generators will be worse off after the investment
in new lines, as shown by the Table below: The European
TABLE II
PROFITS, BILLIONS OF e
Baseline New Lines % change
RES 139.3 138.6 -0.50%
Thermal 64.1 63.6 -0.81%
TOT 203 202 0.60%
overall profits are slightly lower in the new lines scenario,
as they go from 205 billions of euro to 202 billions. Pro-
portionally, renewable generators loose less than the thermal
generators when the new lines are built because they are not
the marginal units. The lower electricity prices with respect
to the ”Baseline” scenario are the driving factor of the lower
profits in the ”Line extensions” scenario. Finally, we compare
the profits of thermal and renewable generators in Greece
and Bulgaria (see Table III). The profits for both thermal
TABLE III
GENERATOR PROFITS, e/M
Baseline New Lines % change
Bulgaria 821 783 -4.9%
Greece 2,323 2,264 -2.6%
(a) RES plants
Baseline New Lines % change
Bulgaria 1,197 1,036 -15.5%
Greece 530 263 -101.3%
(b) Thermal plants
and renewables are lower in the ”Line extensions” scenario
than in the ”Baseline” for both Bulgaria and Greece. More
interconnection will accommodate the renewable generation
better, driving the prices down. As the balancing market is
not considered in our analysis, the lower prices will have the
effect of lowering the profits for all the generators.
3) IC profits: We calculate the profits made by the owners
of the interconnectors as:
piIC =
∑
t
abs(pi − pj)t ∗ abs(NetImport)t (2)
in which t are the day of the year, pi is the wholesale elec-
tricity price of the exporting country and pj is the wholesale
electricity price of the importing country. NetImport is the
flow of net imports from the first country to the other. At
the European level, interconnection profits will decrease, from
4720 to 4607 millions of euros. Table IV focus on the profits
made by the IC between Bulgaria and Greece. The absolute
TABLE IV
IC PROFITS PER MW TRADED, BULGARIA AND GREECE
IC total profits (e/M) IC profits per MW
Baseline 37 326
New Lines 83 178
∆ 46 -148
%change 55.6% -82.7%
value of net profits for the owners of the new interconnectors
is positive, and approximately equal to 46 e/M, but per MW
the profits of the IC owner decreases, as shown in Table IV.
We assume that the owner of the interconnector is the EU, as
the project was financed assuming the involvement of financial
institutions as the EIB. However, the positive profit made on
the congested line between Greece and Bulgaria is not enough
to compensate the losses on other lines. At the EU level, the
profitability of network lines decrease between the ”Baseline”
and the ”Line Extensions” scenario by 1 e/M.
C. Emissions
The investment in new interconnection lines has a negative
effect on the emissions for Europe. Overall emissions increase
by almost 3 millions of tonnes with the new lines built into the
system. Assuming that the emission costs are of 40 e/tonne,
the associate expenditure for Europe will be of 119 e/M. The
new interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria displaces the
Greek CCGTs, and increase the generation by coal and lignite
plants in Bulgaria. The relative high price of gas assumed in
our model partially justifies this result. The effects for Bulgaria
and Greece are shown in detail in the following Table.
TABLE V
EMISSION COSTS, Me
Baseline New Lines Delta
Bulgaria 567 871 304
Greece 730 612 - 119
D. Welfare
The total system costs, minimised by the PLEXOS algo-
rithm, are 49 millions lower in the ”Line extensions” scenario
than in the ”Baseline” scenario (-0.03%). As a result, the
investment in new lines is profitable for the European system
as a whole. However, as shown by the results on prices and
profits, there is a mixed evidence about who gains and looses
from higher interconnection. Consumers will benefit of lower
prices and lower emissions. The profits of generators and
interconnector’s owners will decrease. In order to summarise
the gains and losses, we calculate the European welfare in the
two scenarios. Welfare is defined as the sum of the consumer
surplus, generation profits and interconnection profits. Table
TABLE VI
WELFARE ANALYSIS, EUROPE, Me
Consumers 3,088
Producers - 2,403
IC profits - 1
Net welfare 683
IC costs -13
Welfare + IC costs 670
VI shows that the gains for consumers related to lower prices
and lower emission costs offset the losses made by producers
and interconnector owners. As a result, the investment in
new lines will lead to 683 million gains for Europe. This
number should be taken carefully because it comes from a
number of assumptions. First, fuel prices are assumed quite
high for gas and oil. As gas is frequently the marginal fuel in
the EU system, this assumption makes renewable generation
more profitable by definition. Second, we do not consider here
any potential changes in the final demand. Demand elasticity
may play an important role in reducing the system prices
and further analysis will be required in order to understand
its impact. Finally, just the wholesale electricity market was
considered in our analysis. Retail and balancing market are
not the object of our simulation, so numbers from Table VI
should be taken as a reference, and not considered in their
absolute values. The annual cost for the interconnection, under
the assumption of 4% interest rate and 60 years of economic
life is of 13 millions of euro. Included this into our analysis
the net gain will be of 670 millions. Emission costs will
rise by 119 millions, but they are included in the profits of
the generators. Looking at Bulgaria and Greece more closely,
the new investment in transmission lines between the two
countries will have a positive effect on both countries, as the
gains for consumers will offset the losses of the producers. In
particular, Bulgaria will have a net welfare of 51 millions and
Greece will have a net welfare of 69 millions.
However, the positive European welfare justifies the com-
munitarian approach to the investment lines, as also suggested
by [3] based on evidence for the NordPool market. Compen-
sation mechanisms should be considered in order to promote
the investment in infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the impact of investment in new transmis-
sion lines between EU countries. We run two scenarios. In the
first, we assume that most of the transmission lines envisaged
by the ENTSO-E TYNDP will be operational in 2030. In the
second, we include additional transmission lines in the model
that minimise the total system costs. As a result, we run
the TYNDP model with three new interconnectors between
Bulgaria and Greece. Our results show that new lines lead
to significant welfare gains at the EU level. Consumers will
face lower wholesale electricity prices and lower emissions.
However, generators and interconnectors’ owners will have
lower profits. There is a mixed evidence about emission effects
for the two countries directly affected by the interconnectors.
Bulgaria will increase its emissions, while Greece will reduce
them. These results emphasise that interconnector projects
should be promoted and coordinated at the EU level.
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